In 1993, after an optimistic beginning followed by a half-decadeof conflict, the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) project wasabandoned. In an era of `Big Science', a major scientificenterprise collapsed. Why? We employ the metaphor of the`frontier outpost' to analyse a critical moment in the history ofthis vastly expensive project, when the physicists who designedthe machine were forced to recognize that traditional post-warscientific values were no longer in harmony with governmentpriorities.

This paper argues that historical research is an important tool for modeling problem-solving in scientific invention and discovery. Two important cases in the history of modern physics—the invention of the transistor by John Bardeen and Walter Brattain and the development of the theory of superconductivity by Bardeen, Leon Cooper, and J. Robert Schrieffer—reveal factors essential to include in such a model. The focus is on problem-solving practices: problem decomposition, analogy, bridging principles, team-work, empirical tinkering, and library research. A complete framework (...) must encompass the full range of factors, including contingent individual traits and environmental circumstances. (shrink)

Michael Riordan, Lillian Hoddeson and Adrienne W. Kolb, Tunnel Visions: The Rise and Fall of the Superconducting Super Collider (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), xiii+448 pp.

The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on the same propositions has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective conclusion. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to such a problem as the \textit{discursive dilemma}. In this paper we assume that the decision which the group is trying to reach is factually right or wrong. Hence, we address the question of how good (...) the various approaches are at selecting the right conclusion. We focus on two approaches: distance-based procedures and a Bayesian analysis. They correspond to group-internal and group-external decision-making, respectively. We compare those methods in a probabilistic model, demonstrate the robustness of our results over various generalizations and discuss their applicability in different situations. The findings vindicate (i) that in judgment aggregation problems, reasons should carry higher weight than conclusions and (ii) that considering members of an advisory board to be highly competent is a better strategy than to underestimate their advice.". (shrink)

How does a predecessor theory relate to its successor? According to Heinz Post’s General Correspondence Principle, the successor theory has to account for the em- pirical success of its predecessor. After a critical discussion of this principle, I outline and discuss various kinds of correspondence relations that hold between successive scientific theories. I then look in some detail at a case study from contemporary physics: the various proposals for a theory of high-temperature superconductivity. The aim of this case study is (...) to understand better the prospects and the place of a methodological principle such as the Generalized Correspondence Principle. Generalizing from the case study, I will then argue that some such principle has to be considered, at best, as one tool that might guide scientists in their theoriz- ing. Finally I present a tentative account of why principles such as the Generalized Correspondence Principle work so often and why there is so much continuity in scientific theorizing. (shrink)

Modern science is, to a large extent, a model-building activity. But how are models contructed? How are they related to theories and data? How do they explain complex scientific phenomena, and which role do computer simulations play here? These questions have kept philosophers of science busy for many years, and much work has been done to identify modeling as the central activity of theoretical science. At the same time, these questions have been addressed by methodologically-minded scientists, albeit from a different (...) point of view. While philosophers typically have an eye on general aspects of scientific modeling, scientists typically take their own science as the starting point and are often more concerned with specific methodological problems. There is, however, also much common ground in middle, where philosophers and scientists can engage in a productive dialogue, as the present volume demonstrates. (shrink)

In everyday life, as well as in science, we have to deal with and act on the basis of partial (i.e. incomplete, uncertain, or even inconsistent) information. This observation is the source of a broad research activity from which a number of competing approaches have arisen. There is some disagreement concerning the way in which partial or full ignorance is and should be handled. The most successful approaches include both quantitative aspects (by means of probability theory) and qualitative aspect (by (...) means of graphical or causal models or logic). Some of these approaches have important impacts on various disciplines including philosophy, computer science, statistics, mathematics, physics, and social science. Most notably, the relation between causal and probabilistic information is a topic of interest in all of these fields. (shrink)

Die zeitgenössische Wissenschaftstheorie leidet unter ähnlichen Problemen wie die Wissenschaften, mit denen sie sich befasst. So nimmt auch in der Wissenschaftstheorie die Spezialisierung stark zu, und bei vielen der behandelten Fragestellungen geht es einzig um Detailprobleme, die sich aus einem sich verselbständigenden Diskussionszusammenhang entwickelt haben, wobei der Bezug zur jeweiligen Ausgangsfrage und die größere philosophische Perspektive leicht aus den Augen verloren geht.

The purpose of teaching logic in philosophy is to enable us to evaluate arguments with respect to (formal) validity. Standard logics refer to a concept of validity which allows for the relation of implication to hold between premises and conclusion even in cases where there is no “relevant” connection between the premises and the conclusion. A prominent example for this is the rule “Ex-Falso-Quodlibet” (EFQ), which allows us to infer an arbitrary proposition from a contradiction. The tolerance of irrelevance endorsed (...) by standard logics unfortunately engenders that they cannot adequately fulfill their intended task of analyzing and evaluating philosophical, scientific and everyday-life arguments – instead, their application even gives rise to a multitude of artificial philosophical pseudoproblems (like the problem of the disposition predicates or the problem of counterfactuals). As alternatives to standard logics, there exist non-standard systems called “relevance logics” or “relevant logics” meant to avoid irrelevance. The problem with these systems, however, is that the mainstream relational semantics (“worlds semantics”) available for them is to be considered unintuitive and complex to a degree which is apt to render relevant logics unattractive to the majority of philosophers who are on the lookout not only for adequate, but also simple and efficient technical means for evaluating arguments. Therefore, the main aim of this treatise is to provide an alternative semantics (“rules semantics”) which is comparatively easy to grasp and simple in application. A second aim of the book is to extend the semantics as least as far as it takes to cover more or less all the logical notions philosophers need in their “everyday analyzing”. This includes first order predicate logic, higher order logic (for analyzing talk about “properties” etc.), identity, definite descriptions, abstraction principles and modal logic. This book can be read without having any more background than a good introductory course in classical logic provides. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Vom Neukantianismus zur Ontologie" verfügbar.

The three-dimensional “AIM model” proposed by Hobson et al. is imaginative. However, many kinds of data suggest that the “dimensions” are not orthogonal, but closely correlated. An alternative view is presented in which mental functioning is considered as a continuum, or a group of closely linked continua, running from focused waking activity at one end, to dreaming at the other. The effect of emotional state is increasingly evident towards the dreaming end of the continuum. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms].

Im antiken Athen und Rom war moralkonformes Verhalten eine Ressource von Ansehen. Aber welche konkrete Relevanz hatte Moral in diesem Sinne als soziales Kapital? Welchen Stellenwert hatte sie in den sozialen Zusammenhängen des gegenseitigen Kennens und Anerkennens? Und in welchen Foren, durch welche Medien und in welchen Textgattungen wurden Verhaltensnormen definiert oder ausgehandelt und kommuniziert? 0Die Autorinnen und Autoren zeigen in ihren Beiträgen die nachweisbaren sozialen Konsequenzen eines guten oder schlechten Rufes auf und stellen verschiedene Moraldiskurse vor: von Majestätsprozessen und (...) aristokratischer Moral in der frühen Kaiserzeit über Freizeitbeschäftigungen als Spiegel moralischen Wandels im spätklassischen Athen bis hin zu Klatsch, Gerüchten und fama als moralischem Kapital im spätrepublikanischen und frühkaiserzeitlichen Rom. (shrink)

Protoscience and Reconstruction. A central concept of the constructivist philosophy of science is the term 'protoscience'. From an orthodox point of view, protosciences are bound to give the so called 'measurement-theoretical Apriori' for a science. Protophysics for example defines the quantities 'length', 'time', and 'mass'. Thereby it yields some basic physical laws, which usually are regarded as "laws of nature", but in fact follow already from the definitions of the basic quantities. The attempt to establish other protodisciplines than protophysics is (...) traditionally regarded as not very promising, because other sciences do not like physics build their main theories on certain basic quantities. Nevertheless such enterprises like "protochemistry", "protobiology" and "protopsychology" recently appeared on the scene. Does this mark a breakthrough in constructivist philosophy of science or is this multiplication of protosciences no more than a promotion strategy? In the article it is shown that the orthodox definition of 'protoscience' is in fact far to narrow. An alternative definition is proposed which on one hand preserves the classic tasks of protophysics but on the other hand allows for other protosciences as equally useful enterprises. A central concept within the complex topic "protoscience" is the one of 'reconstruction'. It can be shown that there is a certain ambiguity in the use of this critical concept. Therefore the article ends with a reconstruction of the term 'reconstruction'. (shrink)